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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2(a)-3(2)(d) and (f) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A. Did the Trial Court reach its decision based on facts
not in evidence, leading to incorrect interpretations of other
facts?
Standard of Review: The decision as to what evidence was
actually presented is a matter of law.

In reviewing a trial

court's determination of a question of law, the appellate
court reviews the decision for correctness and affords no
deference to the trial court. Provo River Water Users' Assoc,
vs. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993).
2. Did the trial court improperly admit into evidence
hearsay statements?
Standard of Review: The decision as to whether evidence
is hearsay is presented as a matter of law.
trial

court's

determination

of

a

question

In reviewing a
of

law, the

appellate court reviews the decision for correctness and
affords no deference to the trial court.

Provo River Water

Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993).

1

3.

Did

Defendant's

the

Court

improperly

evidence,

thereby

deny

the

preventing

admission

Defendant

of
from

putting on a defense?
Standard of Review: The decision as to whether evidence
is hearsay is presented as a matter of law.
trial

court's

appellate

court

determination
reviews

of

a

In reviewing a

question

the decision

for

affords no deference to the trial court.

of

law,

the

correctness

and

Provo River Water

Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993).
Standard of Review:
4.

Did the City meet its burden of proving the Defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
Standard of Review:

The decision as to whether evidence

is hearsay is presented as a matter of law.
trial

court's

appellate

court

determination
reviews

of

a

In reviewing a

question

the decision

for

affords no deference to the trial court.

of

law,

the

correctness

and

Provo River Water

Users' Assoc, v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah, 1993).
5. Did Defendant's trial attorney provide
assistance

such

that

Defendant

was

denied

ineffective

his

right

to

effective assistance of counsel?

2

1

S t a n d a r d of R e v i e w :

The d e c i s i o n as to w h e t h e r evidence

is h e a r s a y is p r e s e n t e d as a m a t t e r of law.
trial

court's

appellate

determination

court

reviews

of

the

a

In r e v i e w i n g a

question

decision

for

a f f o r d s i i c: i e f e r e n c e t o 11 i e 1: r i a J c o u r t,

of

law,

the

correctness

and

P r o v o R i v e r W a. t e r

U s e r s ' A s s o c , v. M o r g a n , 857 P.2d 927, 931

(Utah, 1 9 9 3 ) .

S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS
T h e p a r t: i e s '

v e r s i o n s : • f 11 I e f a c t s :> f \ vh a 1: o c c i i r r e d o n

July 3 0 , 1997 are very d i f f e r e n t .

Defendant testified that, he

a l l o w e d the a l l e g e d victii i i, : •. J-.,J-._L^:; .-,:..>.:.-.:.,
him

an

period

apartment
*--r be

war

u] tirr."3rr

in

'-V:P^

his

^nly
V

:

basemenL.
for

-r

^

initially,

f^v; -^ays,

but

Lhe

Ms.

rental

Anderson

- * , . * ; * ;.

On the n i g h t o; L U J V '-Jl/

- 'v" , Defendant was

the acreage -•:.. •-••.,:,..! ; .. - :•. ,,:.-- .
a.m. of the 29 t h of Ju]y.

' . LOIII

:

,, .

;

irrigating

..::. ; .j. —.

. . .

-: )

D e f e n d a n t / o v^iie nad r e c e n t l y had

s u r g e r y , and D e f e n d a n t was spending most of his time that day
c a r i n g f o r h e r a n d mc • n i t o r i n g 1: h e i i: r :i g a t I o n .

L a 1: e

e v e n i n g , he d e c i d e d to go to a m o v i e at: the t h e a t e r
b e 1 Ii r id i Ii s 1 Iouse .
was

wearing

sandals.

i r t: h e

located

B e c a u s e 1: Ie 1 Iad beer i i ri igatii Ig, D e f e n d a n t
Defendant

had

earlier

served

Ms.

A n d e r s o n with at least three e v i c t i o n n o t i c e s , but had been

unable to locate Ms. Anderson to talk to her about her moving
out of the apartment.
On

his

way

back

from

the

movie,

Defendant

saw Ms.

Anderson's children in a car in the driveway by the house.
After being told that she was at home, Defendant went down the
outside stairs to try to talk to Ms. Anderson.

He could see

Ms. Anderson sleeping on the couch through the sliding-glass
door; after several minutes of knocking and the dog barking,
Ms. Anderson finally woke up.

As soon as she saw Defendant,

she got up and lurched to the door, and after opening the
door,

started

calling

the

attacking
police

on

Defendant
her

for

and cursing
abandoning

at him for

her

children.

Defendant pushed Ms. Anderson away from him, and backed up to
a tree about 30 feet away from the door.

Ms. Anderson kept

coming at Defendant all while he was backing up, and her
little dog was nipping at Defendant's feet. At one point, the
dog

actually

bit

Defendant, who then picked

up

the dog,

telling Ms. Anderson that he was going to take the dog to the
pound so it could be put under observation for a few days to
determine

if

it

had

rabies.

Throughout

Anderson continued to attack Defendant.

this

time, Ms.

He finally was able

to get up the hill to where the garage was and put the dog in

4

the garage and close the door.

Contrary to Ms. Anderson's

allegations, Defendant never threatened to kill the dog.
Rather, Defendant told Ms. Anderson that she could pick her
dog up in 10 days, after the quarantine period had run to
determine if it had rabies. Further, during the struggle with
Ms. Anderson, the Defendant's glasses were knocked off his
face.

Defendant found by the tree in his driveway the next

morning, broken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court found the Defendant guilty of the assault,
choosing to believe in whole the testimony of Ms. Anderson,
and giving no credit whatsoever to the testimony of Mr. Sykes.
However,

the

Court

misunderstood

some

of

the evidence,

improperly refused to admit some of the evidence which would
have supported Defendant's claims, and improperly admitted
evidence on behalf of Ms. Anderson and the City.
trial,

Defendant

possession

discovered

that

the

documents which had been

City

Further, at
had

in

its

subpoenaed, but not

produced in response to a subpoena duces tecum.

Finally,

Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in
providing assistance.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT REACHED ITS DECISION BASED ON FACTS OTHER
THAN THOSE INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE; ITS WHOLE DECISION WAS
BASED ON INCORRECT FACTS.

The Trial Court completely misinterpreted some facts put
in evidence, and did not understand other facts.

One of the

most telling problems with the Trial court's findings is its
statement that the testimony of Al Loris was compelling.

The

Court stated "Sometimes a long case can turn on some very
short evidence... In this case I thought the testimony of Al
Loris was essentially compelling. .. It's the very next day,
August 1st."

(Tr. 211) .

The problem is that the incident

occurred on the evening of July 29th and the early morning of
July 30th.

The Court very obviously misunderstood Mr. Sykes'

testimony that he took the dog to a private kennel, and to the
pound two days later.

The Court bases this conclusion on Al

Loris's testimony that, according to his own notes, Mr. Sykes
brought the dog in at 7:30 on the 1st of August.

However, not

only does this completely contradict Mr. Sykes' testimony, it
does not make any sense.

Mrs. Anderson testified that the

incident occurred on July 29th and 30th, and not August 1, as
understood by the Court.

6

The Trial Court mis-cited the date on the back of the
photos introduced by Defendant as being taken on August 1,
even though the date on the back of each one is July 30, 1997.
This

is

important

because,

again,

the

Court

used

the

discrepancy in dates as one basis for discounting all of
Defendant's testimony.

The Trial Court found that the dated

photos introduced by Defendant to show that Mrs. Anderson had
moved out did not make any sense because they were dated the
same day he took the dog to Officer Loris.
The Court also states that another concern of his was
that the dog died five days after being taken to the pound.
(Tr. 213). The Court's whole colloquy is to the effect that
the dog would not have died so soon if all Mr. Sykes did was
hold it by the scruff of the neck.

However, the evidence was

that the dog died on August 9th, and died because it was
euthanized.

There is no evidence that the dog died of

anything that Mr. Sykes did or did not do.

Mr. Loris

testified that the dog was euthanized on the 9th. (Tr. 72).
Interestingly, this would be 8 days from the date which Mr.
Sykes claims to have took the dog to the pound, and 10 days
from which Mr. Sykes took the dog to the private kennel, and
which the Court said was wrong, because of Mr. Loris' notes.

7

Based on the testimony of Mr. Loris, it is much more likely
that Mr. Sykes' testimony was correct—he took the dog to the
pound on August 1st, and the pound euthanized it on August 9th.
Why the pound did so is open to speculation—the City would
have us believe that it was because the dog was sick, and the
Court agreed.

However, it should be noted that it was not,

according to Mr. Loris's own testimony, put down until after
what was logically the end of the 10 day quarantine period.
These points are important because the Court discounts
Mr. Sykes testimony because it believes he is lying.

The

Court stated at the beginning of its decision
"One of the instructions we give juries, *If you find
that a witness has testified falsely as to a material
fact, you may, but are not obliged to, disregard all of
the testimony of that witness.' In this case I thought
the testimony of Officer Al Loris was essentially
compelling... It's the very next day, August 1."
(Tr.
210).
Because

it

misunderstood

the

facts

presented

into

evidence, the Court decided that Defendant was lying, and all
of

decided

discounted.

that

all

of

Defendant's

testimony

should

be

However, the Court reached its conclusion on

false premises.

Mr. Sykes was not lying about what happened.

The City's own evidence shows that what Mr. Sykes testified to
is really what likely happened.

The Court indicated that

8

\

another reason that it did not believe Mr. Sykes' testimony
was that the whole incident just couldn't have occurred as he
said if his water turn started at 11:40 p.m.

(Tr. 215, 216).

However, the record is explicit that the Defendant's water
turn started at 11:40 a.m.

(Tr. 180, 196, 197). Based on the

testimony, which was uncontroverted, Mr. Sykes' time frame was
very workable.
Sykes was

However, because the Court believed that Mr.

lying because

it misunderstood

these

facts, it

completely discounted the rest of Mr. Sykes' testimony.
Very clearly, the Court based its decision on the wrong
facts,

facts

witness.

which

were

not

what

was

introduced

by

any

Had the Court correctly understood the facts as

testified to by even the City's witnesses, it would have to
reconsider its decision, based on its own statements.
II.

DID THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMIT HEARSAY EVIDENCE?
It

has

evidence,

long

because

been
of

a
its

rule

of

inherent

evidence

that

unreliability,

hearsay
is

not

admissible in court. This is clearly stated in URE §802. Even
though there are numerous exceptions to this rule, a court is
still not allowed to admit into evidence hearsay testimony,
unless the party trying to get it admitted can show that it
fits within one of the exceptions. Utah Rule of Evidence §802

9

states

"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law

or by these rules." The Court, over repeated objections (Tr.
82, 83), allowed Officer Carter to testify that the police
dispatcher told him that the dispatcher had telephoned the
Sykes residence immediately after taking the call about the
altercation, and spoken with a female who said she was Mrs.
Sykes. Very clearly, this is hearsay. The dispatcher was not
present to testify about her conversation, nor to be crossexamined about how she had identified the female who answered
the phone as Mrs. Sykes.
This admittance of hearsay is important because the Trial
Court later used it to justify, in part, its finding that
i

Defendant was guilty.

The Court stated that Mrs. Sykes had

been lucid enough to answer the phone, but never answered the
door, and that clearly what occurred was that Mr. Sykes was

\

not out irrigating, as he testified, but was in the house,
told his wife to hang up the phone, and that refused to talk
i

to the police.

(Tr. 217) . The Court refused

to allow

Defendant to introduce evidence that Mrs. Sykes had denied
ever answering the phone that night, and that the female was

<

probably someone in the basement apartment where a phone jack
to the upstairs phone remained.

But, the Court did allow the

10
i

hearsay

evidence

about

the

whole

conversation.

The

prosecution made no attempt to claim that the testimony fell
within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, and the
whole conversation should have been excluded.

Instead, the

Court relied in part on this hearsay testimony to decide that
Defendant was not being truthful, and therefore discounted all
of the testimony of Defendant.
In State v. Long, 721 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that the hearsay rule has as its declared
purpose the exclusion of evidence not subject to crossexamination
asserted.

concerning

the

truthfulness

of

the

matters

This case is the epitome of why the rule exists.

Defendant should have had the opportunity to challenge the
accuracy of what was said, to determine how the dispatcher
knew whom she was talking to over the phone.

Instead, the

prosecution was able to use the hearsay to sway the Court's
opinion of the veracity of all of Defendant's testimony. Very
clearly,

Officer

Carter's

testimony

about

the

phone

conversation should not have been allowed, nor should it have
been relied on by the Court.
III. THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY WITHHELD KEY DOCUMENTS FROM
DEFENDANT WHICH HAD BEEN REQUESTED PURSUANT TO DISCOVERY.
Attached as Exhibit "A" is Defendant's Subpoena Duces
11

Tecum to the Orem City Police Department.
service

show that it was served

The two returns of

Sept. 4, 1997 on both

locations of relevant police records, i.e., served personally
on Officer Albert Loris, Director of the Orem Police Animal
Pound, and served personally on the Orem Police Records
Secretary.

This subpoena duces tecum is comprehensive and

clear in its requirement:
... in the above entitled action... copies of all
police files, dates, times, witness statements, police
notes, reports, comments, records, documents, etc....
Include all police records and computer entries and
printouts obtainable regarding Dwane Sykes and Priscilla
Anderson during 1997.
Despite this very clearly broad subpoena, Officer Loris
intentionally refused and failed to produce certain documents
which he later used at trial., because they were not spelled
out by name.

The following documents were not produced by

Officer Loris, despite the subpoena duces tecum very clearly
stated that they should be produced: Police dog pound intake
card; handwritten police complaint entry log dated 7/30/97;

<

$20 Ribbonwood Kennel Receipt & Defendant's $20 check; and
Officer Loris' dog delivery receipt to Sykes.

Each of the
i

documents withheld from Defendant was an issue raised by the
Trial Court in determining that Defendant was not being honest
with

the

Court,

and

therefore

resulted

in

Defendant's

{

12
4

testimony being discounted.

The Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure very clearly state that the prosecutor is "shall"
produce any and all evidence which tends to mitigate the guilt
of the Defendant.

URCrP 16(a).

In the present case, the

Defendant very clearly subpoenaed these documents, and Officer
Loris intentionally, by his own testimony, failed to produce
these documents. By doing so, the prosecution interfered with
the

preparation

prosecution

and

presentation

obviously

felt

that

of

its

these

defense.

The

documents

were

important, as it showed when it used these documents at trial.
However, the prosecution should not have been allowed to
introduce or use any documents which had been requested but
not produced. The documents which Defendant is most concerned
about

are

the

card

on which Officer

Loris' notes were

contained; the numerous written reports which Defendant filed
with the police department regarding the incident; and records
of the police department that showed that Defendant actually
did call the department several times regarding the incident.
IV.
DID THE PROSECUTION FAIL TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT?
The standard that the prosecution must meet in order to
show a Defendant guilty is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the present case, there is most definitely a question about
13

whether the prosecution met its burden, based on the points
raised above.

It should be noted again that the Court, in

order to find Defendant guilty, had to discount completely
Defendant's testimony, for what have been shown to be spurious
reasons.

Further, the Court had to rely on facts other than

those presented as evidence by either side.

This clearly

shows that the prosecution did not meet its burden, and but
for the incorrect facts relied on by the Court, the Defendant
could not have been found guilty of any of the charges.
It is particularly important that the Court, in finding
the Defendant guilty of the assault charge, completely ignored
Defendant's testimony that Mrs. Anderson was the one who awoke
angry, and actually charged at Defendant.

The Court, by its

own statement, ignored Defendant's testimony because it found
he had lied about much of what had happened.

The Court found

that Defendant was lying because of the facts on which it
decided to rely.

However, as shown above, those facts were

not introduced into evidence, nor shown by the evidence that
was admitted.
own

Defendant believes that, based on the Court's

statements,

had

the

Court

understood

the

evidence

correctly and relied on what was actually introduced, it could
not

have

decided

that

Defendant

was

lying

and

totally
i

14

discounted his testimony.

Further, had the Court not found

the Defendant had lied, the Court could not have found him
guilty because there was substantial evidence to support many
of his claims he testified to.
V.
DID DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?

PROVIDE

INEFFECTIVE

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides "
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for his defence/'
Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution also provides "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel."

It is also very

clear from an abundance of case law that in order to protect
an individual's constitutional right to legal counsel, the
counsel that a defendant receives must be "effective".
issue

then

becomes

one

of what

The

constitutes "effective"

assistance of counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court outlined
the standard that must be met by a defendant to establish the
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court stated that the
proper standard was that the Defendant had to show that, but

15

for the counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.
In the present case, the Defendant believes he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, under both the U. S. and
Utah Constitutions, for several reasons.

First, despite the

Defendant's request that his attorney request a jury trial,
his attorney insisted on trying the case to the bench, with
the obvious result of the Defendant's conviction.
Defendant's

trial

counsel

failed

to

object

to

Second,
numerous

instances of hearsay evidence being presented, and admitted.
Third, trial counsel failed to properly cross-examine at least
one witness, Al Loris, when it was clear that there were very
clear discrepancies in his testimony.

Fourth, Defendant's

trial counsel failed to provide notice as required by law of
his intent to use an expert witness, who was then not allowed
to testify.

Based on the cumulative effect of these lapses,

Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel.
In his closing statements, the Judge very clearly stated
that part of the reason he was discounting most, if not all,
of the Defendant's testimony was because it did not coincide
with the testimony of Al Loris, whom the Court considered to
be

the

prosecution's

most

telling
16

witness.

(Tr. 211).

However,

had

Defendant's

trial

counsel

adequately

cross-

examined Mr. Loris, he could have established that the time
frame outlined by Mr. Loris did not make any sense, in light
of when the rest of the incident occurred. Based on Mr. Loris'
testimony,

the

court

had

to

assume

that

the

dog

pound

proceeded to put the dog to sleep within five days of its
being brought in, contrary to its own guidelines.

It is

obvious that there was a very serious discrepancy

in the

evidence

of the

and

the

incident occurred.

time

frame

in which

each

event

Defendant's trial counsel should have

taken great pains to make clear the time at which everything
occurred.

Instead, he left it up to the Court to try and

figure out how to resolve the discrepancies.

The Court chose

to do so by disbelieving everything the Defendant testified
to, no matter how incredulous the resulting interpretation.
Based

on the Court's

decision,

had

statement

Defendant's

on how it arrived

counsel

adequately

at its

shown

the

problems with Mr. Loris' testimony, the Court may very well
have decided the case differently.
no

reason

to

discount

most,

if

The Court would have had
not

all, of

Defendant's

testimony, and Defendant's testimony would have been in fact

17

corroborated by the testimony of the only truly independent
witness to testify.
Defendant's counsel also failed to object to most of the
hearsay testimony offered by the prosecution; again, this
shows that counsel was ineffective. Had the Court been forced
to rule on the hearsay evidence that was presented, it may
well have been forced, and wanted, to rely more on Defendant's
testimony than it obviously did.
The

third

instance

showing

that

Defendant

received

ineffective assistance of counsel is shown by trial counsel's
failure to file the notice of appeal.

It is a matter of

record that Defendant filed his own notice of appeal, and many
of the subsequent documents.

Immediately after the trial,

Defendant asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal; even
after repeated requests to do so, Defendant's trial counsel to
do so, and Defendant ultimately had file his own notice, in
order to preserve his right to appeal.

Defendant should not

have been forced to file his own notice of appeal in order to
preserve

his

right

to

have

the

trial

court's

decision

reviewed.

18
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CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the above, there were numerous errors
in the trial of Defendant, the cumulative effect of which
justifies a new trial.

Defendant was obviously found guilty

based on facts which were not presented as evidence by either
party, at least as stated by the Court; hearsay evidence,
which became in part the basis for the finding of guilt, was
admitted

over

the

objection

of

Defendant's

attorney;

the

prosecution did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as
shown by the Court's reliance on facts which were not ever
presented by either party; key documents, which were requested
by Defendant through a subpoena duces tecum, were withheld,
intentionally, by the prosecution and police; and Defendant's
trial

counsel

was

ineffective,

as

shown

by

his

lack

of

knowledge of criminal procedure and his failure to file the
request
earlier,

for a new trial
the

cumulative

or notice
effect

of

of appeal.
these

errors

As

noted

deprived

Defendant of a fair hearing as guaranteed by both the U.S. and
Utah Constitutions.

Accordingly, the case should be remanded

for a new trial.
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DATED this 2/"1 day of August, 1999

Randy M. Lish
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of August, 1999, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to Robert Church, Orem City Prosecutor, 97 E.
Center, Orem, UT 84057.
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ADDENDUM

I

(

i

_

0(W

4 T H CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
CITY OF OREM,

PkurJij?
SUBPOENA
DUCES TECUM

vs.

DWANE J . SYKES

xsxmxra

1511 South Carter-vine Rd,
Orem, Utah 34097
Defendants1,

Criminal No.
971-1214

(Include address and DOE)
THE STATE OF UTAH TO:
(Name)

{Address}

(Dare Served]

OREM CITY, POLICE,RECORDS DIVISION Orem City Bldq. St & Center St.

ss,

Sept.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear and give testimony in the above-entitled actJon. before
the above court at the following time and place: to prcduce copies of all police case f i l e s , da1
witness statements, police notes, reports, comments, records, documents, per atLcched pj
Hand- Delivery immediately upon receipt, wi tPSSv copies not immediately available
promptr? maued to:
m c c
Dwane Sykes, 1511 South Carterville Rd., Orem, Utah 34097-7244 (oh. 225-0!
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED

to bring with you the following papers, documents, or

other items: see above and attached pages. Include all police records and computer entr
its obtainable regarding 5Wane Sykes and Pricillia Anderson during 1997.
If you fail to obey this subpoena, the court may issue a waiTanpfesfflKSs^rrest.
Date Sept.-3; 1997

INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESS
To receive payment of your witness fee and mileage: (1) bring this subpoena with you to court, (2)
present the subpoena to clerk of the COUIT, and (3) sign the witness book. Payment will be mailed to you.

SFAS»021»

